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In this paper, we investigate the determinants of households’ inflation expectations in 
Japan and the United States. We estimate a vector autoregression model in which the 
four endogenous variables are inflation expectations, inflation, the short-term nominal 
interest rate and the output gap, with energy prices and (fresh) food prices being 
exogenous. Short-term nonrecursive restrictions are imposed taking account of 
simultaneous codependence between realized inflation and expected inflation. We 
find, first, that responding not only to changes in energy prices and food prices but 
also to monetary policy shocks, inflation expectations adjust more quickly than does 
realized inflation. This explains why Japanese and US data indicate that inflation 
expectations lead realized inflation. Second, the effects of changes in energy prices 
and food prices on inflation and inflation expectations are large in the short run in 
Japan, while in the United States, they are not only large but also long lasting. Third, 
shocks to expectations occasionally fluctuate greatly, and can have self-fulfilling 
effects on realized inflation. The self-fulfilling property is more apparent in the 
United States than in Japan. 
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1.  Introduction 
Inflation expectations are important in conducting monetary policy for many reasons. 
First, their self-fulfilling property causes actual inflation. It is often said that an 
uncontrollable increase in inflation expectations generated the hyper-inflation of the 1970s. 
Second, inflation expectations matter because they affect real interest rates, and thereby the 
real economy and actual inflation. The effect of monetary policy is thus greatly constrained 
by how expectations are formed. Third, inflation expectations influence wage negotiations 
between employers and employees. At the same time, inflation expectations are affected by 
wages, which can induce price–wage spirals. Fourth, uncertainty about expectations 
discourages real activities and results in inefficient resource allocation. For these reasons, 
inflation expectations are important for monetary policy. However, little is known about their 
properties, as Federal Reserve Board chairman Bernanke (2007) states: 
Undoubtedly, the state of inflation expectations greatly influences actual 
inflation and thus the central bank’s ability to achieve price stability. But 
what do we mean, precisely, by “the state of inflation expectations”? How 
should we measure inflation expectations, how should we use the information 
for forecasting and controlling inflation? I certainly do not have complete 
answers to those questions, but I believe that they are of practical importance 
(emphasis is added in italic). 
In this paper, we aim to answer Bernanke’s second question.
1 We further aim to answer the 
supplementary questions prompted by the following request by Bernanke (2007):   
… we must understand better the historical variation in inflation expectations, 
the effect of this variation on actual inflation and economic activity, and the 
relationship between policy actions and the formation of inflation 
expectations. 
There are a number of empirical studies of the formation of inflation expectations. For 
example, Carlson and Parkin (1975) argue that past inflation affects inflation expectations. 
Supposing perfect foresight, Roberts (1998) and Oshima and Nakayama (1999) argue that not 
only past inflation but also predicted future inflation affects inflation expectations. 
Mullineaux (1980), Gramlich (1983) and Pearce (1987) examine the effects on inflation 
                                                  
1  How to measure inflation expectations, which is the first question raised by Bernanke (2007), is 
beyond the scope of this paper. See Carlson and Parkin (1975) and Berk (2000) for details of the 
methods used to transform qualitative survey data into quantitative estimates. The papers by 
Toyoda (1987) and Hirata and Kamada (2006) are available only in Japanese. For the comparisons 
of inflation expectations among different types of agents, see Gramlich (1983), Batchelor and Dua 
(1989), Roberts (1998), Oshima and Nakayama (1999), Thomas (1999) and Mankiw et al. (2003). 
The distribution of inflation expectations is analyzed by Carlson and Parkin (1975), Batchelor and 
Dua (1989), Mankiw et al. (2003) and Hirata and Kamada (2006).  2
expectations of government policy and the money supply. 
However, to our knowledge, Berk (2000) represents the only attempt to study the effect 
on inflation expectations of short-term nominal interest rates, which are considered the 
instrument of monetary policy.
2 His two-step approach can be summarized as follows. First, 
using data for Europe, he estimates a vector autoregression (VAR) model in which the five 
variables are the domestic money market rate and its foreign equivalent, the inflation rate, 
industrial production and the money stock. He then obtains an estimated monetary policy 
shock from the residual of the interest rate equation in the VAR. Second, he uses a vector 
error correction model (VECM) of inflation and expected inflation, in which the constructed 
monetary policy shock is included as an exogenous variable. Berk finds that the monetary 
policy shock does not have a statistically significant impact on inflation expectations. 
However, Berk’s method seems problematic for two reasons. First, there is no explanation of 
his identification strategy for the VAR, and the monetary policy shock is unlikely to be 
properly identified. Second, even if this is not the case, he should have integrated his two-step 
procedure into one by constructing a five-variable VAR or VECM. 
In this paper, to investigate the determinants of inflation expectations, we use a structured 
VAR (SVAR) model. By using both Japanese and US data, we construct a four-variable VAR 
in which the endogenous variables are the output gap, the short-term nominal interest rate, 
realized inflation and inflation expectations. The exogenous variables are energy price 
changes and (fresh) food price changes. Then, taking account of simultaneous codependence 
between realized inflation and expected inflation, we impose a nonrecursive restriction to 
identify structural shocks. 
Our analyses shows that, first, responding not only to changes in energy prices and food 
prices, but also to monetary policy shocks, inflation expectations adjust more quickly than 
does realized inflation. This explains why Japanese and US data indicate that inflation 
expectations lead realized inflation. It is also shown that our SVAR procedure resolves the 
price puzzle; an interest rate rise decreases prices even on impact. Second, in Japan and the 
United States, changes in energy prices and food prices have large effects on inflation and 
inflation expectations. However, these are only short-run effects in Japan, while in the United 
States, they are persistent. Third, shocks to expectations occasionally fluctuate greatly, and 
may have self-fulfilling effects on realized inflation. The self-fulfilling property is more 
apparent in the United States than in Japan. 
                                                  
2  In addition to studies of the effects of short-term nominal interest rates, there are also studies of 
the effects of other monetary policy instruments. For example, Hori and Shimizutani (2003) 
analyze a survey that directly asks respondents about the effect on inflation expectations of the 
quantitative easing of monetary policy implemented from 2001 in Japan. From the perspective of 
inflation targeting, Orphanides and Williams (2002) and Erceg and Levin (2003) study people’s 
learning processes and their inflation expectations.  3
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of inflation 
expectations. In Section 3, we explain our methodology. In Sections 4 and 5, respectively, we 
report our estimation results for Japan and the United States. In Section 6, we examine the 
robustness of our results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Overview of Inflation Expectations 
Inflation expectations data are divided into two main categories: market-based inflation 
expectations, which are reflected in Treasury inflation-protection securities, and survey-based 
inflation expectations. In this paper, we focus on the latter. Table 1 reports the survey-based 
inflation expectations data that are available in Japan. In the first three surveys, because 
respondents are households, one can examine inflation expectations from the perspective of 
the buyers of goods. Of these three surveys, the Consumer Confidence Survey, which began 
in 1971, covers the longest period. This survey is therefore useful for conducting time-series 
analysis. However, a major limitation is that its information is qualitative; that is, households 
are asked if future price changes are expected to be “good (lower)” or “bad (higher)”. Thus, 
one has to transform this qualitative information into quantitative information by using an 
appropriate procedure, such as that developed by Carlson and Parkin (1975). TANKAN, the 
fourth survey in the table, is a survey of enterprises. Thus, the answers from retail industries 
can be used to examine inflation expectations from the perspective of the sellers of final 
goods. However, this survey is also qualitative. In the final two surveys in the table, 
respondents are economists. Consensus Forecasts publishes their inflation expectations over 
horizons of one quarter to ten years, and these expectations are quantitative. However, this 
information from Consensus Forecasts is only available from 1990, and the respondents are 
not necessarily experts on the Japanese economy. 
In this paper, we focus on household inflation expectations. This is done for two reasons. 
First, households are important economic agents. Their inflation expectations almost certainly 
influence the real economy through real interest rates and wage negotiations. Moreover, their 
inflation expectations affect realized inflation by affecting households’ consumption demands, 
and because some are price-setters. Second (as shown subsequently), households’ inflation 
expectations appear to lead realized inflation by one to three quarters. We attempt to explain 
this finding, which is of particular interest. 
Of the available household surveys, we use the Consumer Confidence Survey because it 
covers the longest period. We construct two types of measures of inflation expectations. One 
is a diffusion index (DI), which is constructed by assigning scores of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1, 
respectively, to respondents’ expectations that prices will be “higher”, “slightly higher”, “no  4
change”, “slightly lower”, and “lower”.
3 The scores are converted into a figure for expected 
inflation by applying the method developed by Carlson and Parkin (1975), which is the most 
widely known and used method. This method assumes that respondents report a variable to 
rise or fall if their evaluation lies above or below a certain threshold; it is also assumed that 
their answers are symmetric and normally distributed. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
average value of past realizations equals the average value of expectations. Given these 
assumptions, one obtains the threshold value and inflation expectations for each period. For 
data on prices, we use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all goods except fresh food. CPI 
for all goods except fresh food and 10% trimmed mean CPI are said to show better 
performances than other core inflation indicators in terms of tracking the underlying trend of 
inflation and forecasting the future direction of headline inflation (Shiratsuka [2006]). CPI for 
all goods except fresh food is the most widely used index in Japanese monetary policy 
analysis. 
Figure 1 illustrates the movement of households’ inflation expectations. In the graph, the 
inflation rate for each period indicates the price change from the previous year. The inflation 
expectation for each period represents the difference between the current price and the 
expected future price. We find that realized and expected inflation are highly correlated, and 
that inflation expectations change more quickly than does realized inflation. Table 2 supports 
these findings. The correlation between the Carlson−Parkin measure of expected inflation and 
realized inflation is as large as 0.7, and the expected inflation leads realized inflation by two 
to three quarters. This finding is confirmed when using data from 1990, when adjusting for 
the inflationary effect of the consumption tax hikes of April 1989 and April 1997, and 
whether using the CPI including or excluding food and energy. 
Next, we compare the inflation expectations of households with those of retailers and 
professional economists. Table 3 shows that the lead length of households’ inflation 
expectations exceeds those of retailers’ and economists’ inflation expectations. 
Similar findings apply to the United States. Table 4 summarizes the main surveys of 
inflation expectations. The Michigan Survey provides households’ inflation expectations, 
while the Livingston Survey, Survey of Professional Forecasters and Consensus Forecasts 
provide professional economists’ expectations. In contrast with Japan, all four US surveys are 
quantitative. Thus, the Carlson−Parkin method is not needed. As Figure 2 and Table 5 show, 
households’ inflation expectations lead realized inflation for both the CPI and the core PCE 
deflator by one quarter and three quarters, respectively. Table 6 compares the inflation 
expectations of households with those of economists. We find that economists’ inflation 
expectations do not lead realized inflation. These findings are consistent with those of 
                                                  
3  For some survey periods, the number of choices is three (rather than five), to which we assign 
scores of 0, 0.5 and 1, respectively.  5
Thomas (1999). 
A question that arises at this stage is why households’ inflation expectations change more 
quickly than does realized inflation. To answer this question, in the following sections, we 
examine the determinants of households’ inflation expectations. 
 
3.  Methodology 
We use an SVAR to examine the determinants of inflation expectations. We assume that 
the true model can be written as 
], ' [ , ) ( 1 0 t t n t t t e e E I e X L A X A = + = −      (1) 
where Xt is a vector of n endogenous variables, A0 and A(L) are coefficient matrices, and L is 
the lag operator. The structured shocks, et, are assumed to be mutually orthogonal, and their 
variance−covariance matrix is an n × n identity matrix. A standard VAR method is described 
by the following reduced form: 
]. ' [ , ) ( 1 t t t t t E X L B X ε ε ε = Σ + = −     ( 2 )  
In this case, the obtained shocks,  t ε , are mutually dependent, and thus cannot be regarded as 
structural. Therefore, one needs to impose restrictions, and identify mutually independent 
structural shocks that cause the endogenous variables to fluctuate. In general, the number of 
restrictions needed is n(n-1)/2. 
We impose a nonrecursive restriction. Of the proposed approaches, the simplest is to 
impose a recursive restriction. This method assigns a certain time ordering to the endogenous 
variables. It is the most widely used method in macroeconomic studies, particularly for the 
analyses of monetary policy (see, for example, Sims [1980, 1992], Bernanke and Mihov 
[1998] and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [1999]). However, applying this method to 
inflation expectations is inappropriate because inflation expectations affect, and are 
simultaneously affected by, inflation. Thus, we impose a nonrecursive restriction, as 
developed by, for example, Kim (1999) and Sims and Zha (2005). This enables us to 
incorporate the interaction between inflation and inflation expectations and assess the 
determinants of inflation expectations. 
Before moving to our nonrecursive restriction, we explain our VAR specification. We 
estimate a VAR model that has four endogenous variables. These are the output gap (y), the 
short-term nominal interest rate (i), the inflation rate from the previous quarter (π ) and the 
current expected inflation rate (
e π ). Short-term nominal interest rates are contracted interest 
rates on loans and discounts (short term and stock) available from the Bank of Japan. We use 
these data, rather than data on overnight call rates, because the latter had a zero lower bound 
around 2000. The output gap is calculated by Hara et al. (2006) using a production function 
approach. The inflation rate is the change in CPI, excluding fresh food, from the previous 
quarter. Adjustments are made for seasonality and for the effects of consumption taxes. These  6
measures of the output gap and inflation are used because the Bank of Japan appears to assign 
them the most weight; hence, their use helps us to identify a monetary policy shock. 
Moreover, CPI excluding fresh food is said to show better performances than other core 
inflation indicators in terms of tracking the underlying trend of inflation and forecasting the 
future direction of headline inflation (Shiratsuka [2006]). Inflation expectations are calculated 
using the Carlson−Parkin method. Inflation expectations are not adjusted for the effect of 
consumption taxes because it is difficult to identify when and how much households change 
their inflation expectations responding to announced changes in consumption taxes. We also 
use the following exogenous variables: oil price changes from the previous quarter (dPoil), 
fresh food price changes from the previous quarter (dPfresh) and consumption tax dummies. 
Fresh food prices are seasonally adjusted. The first two variables have no more than one lag. 
Oil price data are taken from the Nikkei oil index. Consumption tax dummies take the value 
unity from 1988:Q4 to 1989:Q1 and from 1996:Q4 to 1997:Q1, and zero otherwise. Our 
sample period ranges from 1975:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
4 The number of lags selected by the 
Hannan−Quinn information criterion is two. All data are in logarithms multiplied by 100. 
We use a similar VAR specification for the United States, for which the four endogenous 
variables are the output gap, the federal fund rate, the inflation rate and the expected inflation 
rate. The output gap is obtained using the Hodrick−Prescott filter. The price index used is 
core PCE deflator excluding food and energy and is seasonally adjusted. We use these 
measures of the output gap and inflation because they seem to be assigned the most weight by 
the Federal Reserve; hence, their use helps us to identify a monetary policy shock. Inflation 
expectations are the mean of households’ one-year-ahead forecasts of inflation, obtained from 
the Michigan Survey.
5 The two exogenous variables are the change in energy prices 
(dPenergy) and the change in food prices (dPfood). Both variables have no more than one lag. 
Food prices are seasonally adjusted. The sample period ranges from 1970:Q1 to 2007:Q4. 
The number of lags selected using the Hannan−Quinn information criterion is three. 
To find the true structured model, we impose the zero restriction described in equation (3) 
below. Given the definition  }' , , , {
e
t t t t t i y X π π = , the coefficient matrix A0 in equation (1) is: 
.
x x x x
x x 0 x
x 0 x 0














= A        (3) 
Because there are four variables, we impose 4(4−1)/2 = 6 zero restrictions. From equation (1), 
                                                  
4  Data on the output gap are available from 1975:Q1. 
5  We use mean (rather than median) inflation expectations these data are available over a longer 
period.  7
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The rationale for this restriction is as follows. The first equation implies that the output gap 
does  not respond contemporaneously to the other variables. The corresponding shock is 
interpreted as a demand shock. As is shown subsequently, this interpretation is justified by 
looking at the impulse response to a positive demand shock that raises the output gap, 
inflation and expected inflation. The second equation implies that a central bank cannot 
monitor the current inflation rate or the current output gap, but that it is forward-looking and 
takes account of households’ inflation expectations to proxy its own expectations. The 
coefficient a1 is expected to be positive. The corresponding shock is interpreted as an interest 
rate (monetary policy) shock by the central bank. Third, inflation is not contemporaneously 
responsive to the interest rate because of the lagged effect of monetary policy. This equation 
is comparable to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The coefficients a2 and a3 are expected to 
be positive, and a3 is expected to be less than unity because of price stickiness. The 
corresponding shock is interpreted as an unexpected inflation shock. In the fourth equation, 
no zero restriction is imposed. This is because we aim to identify the determinants of inflation 
expectations, about which little is known. Another reason is that people are assumed to form 
their expectations by taking account of all the currently available information. We expect the 
coefficients a4, a5 and a6 to be positive. The corresponding shock is interpreted as an inflation 
expectations shock. 
In this restriction, we assume simultaneous interactions between inflation expectations 
and inflation and between inflation expectations and the interest rate. The inflation 
expectations shock contemporaneously and indirectly affect inflation and the interest rate, 
because in the second and third equations, the inflation expectations shock 
contemporaneously influence inflation expectations, and in turn, inflation and the interest rate. 
In an opposite direction, there is a feedback from inflation and the interest rate to inflation 
expectations. Such simultaneous interactions are intrinsic to nonrecursive restrictions (Kims 
[1999] and Sims and Zha [2005]). For example, Kim (1999) uses the world export 
commodity price index instead of inflation expectations, and imposes a nonrecursive 
restriction that has a simultaneous interaction between the world export commodity price 
index and the interest rate. He then identifies five structural shocks including the monetary 
                                                  
6  For simplicity, we omit the exogenous variables from this expression.  8
policy shock, and studies the contribution of the structural shocks to output fluctuations. 
 
4.  Estimation Results (Japan) 
4.1 Estimated Coefficients 
From the estimated reduced-form VAR, the coefficients, a1 to a6, are derived as shown in 
Table 7. To compute the corresponding confidence intervals, we use the Monte-Carlo 
simulations of 10,000 draws based on the following distribution for the reduced-form 
parameters and covariance matrix 
], , ) ˆ [( ~
] ) ' ( ), ˆ ( [ ~ ) (
1
1
p T T IW






where  B ˆ  and Σ ˆ   are the estimated parameters and covariance matrix, N[] denotes the 
normal distribution, IW[] denotes the inverted Wishart distribution, and p and T are the 
number of explanatory variables and observations, respectively. By using the covariance 
matrix from each draw, we calculate the coefficients a1 to a6 and sum them up to yield the 
figures reported in Table 7.
7 
As expected, all coefficients are positive except for a3, which is insignificant. This 
validates our VAR restrictions. 
 
4.2 Impulse Responses 
Figure 3 illustrates the impulse responses of the four endogenous variables to four 
structural shocks. Each column represents a structural shock whose magnitude is one standard 
error, and each row represents the responses of the endogenous variables. Solid lines 
represent the means, and dotted lines represent the 16th and 84th percentiles. 
The first column shows that a positive shock increases the output gap, inflation, inflation 
expectations and the interest rate. Thus, this shock is interpreted as the demand shock. The 
second column shows the responses to a positive interest rate shock in the monetary policy. A 
rise in interest rates causes the output gap and inflation expectations to decrease on impact. 
Inflation decreases on impact, too. This result suggests that the price puzzle is resolved 
because we use the data of inflation expectations for estimation and we impose the 
nonrecursive restriction described as equation (3). We also find that inflation expectations 
respond more quickly than does inflation. This result suggests that there is price stickiness 
and that households correctly forecast the future direction of price changes following a 
monetary policy shock. The response of inflation on impact is not large, but is persistent. The 
                                                  
7  Because of nonrecursive restrictions, in the Monte-Carlo simulation, we did not always obtain 
finite coefficients. In such cases, we took another draw. For this and subsequent estimations, the 
probability of having to redraw was about 10% to 30%.  9
third column suggests that a positive inflation shock raises inflation, and thereby interest rates, 
but its impact on inflation expectations is small. Output decreases. Therefore, this shock 
resembles a negative supply shock. The fourth column illustrates the responses to a positive 
inflation expectations shock. Such a shock raises inflation expectations on impact, and this 
increase is accompanied by an increase in interest rates. However, its effect on inflation is 
insignificant. To sum up, these impulse responses appear reasonable, which validates our 
VAR restrictions. 
Figure 4 illustrates the impulse responses of the four endogenous variables to 
one-standard-error changes in the exogenous variables. Inflation expectations promptly react 
to changes in oil prices and fresh food prices. These effects are transitory. Realized inflation 
reacts relatively slowly to changes in oil prices and fresh food prices, but these effects are 
persistent. The slow response of inflation to fresh food prices is partly explained by the fact 
that our price index excludes fresh food. 
In summary, these results suggest that households’ inflation expectations lead realized 
inflation because households’ expectations react to both monetary policy changes and 
changes in oil prices and fresh food prices more quickly than does realized inflation. This 
reflects the sluggish response of realized inflation to expected inflation. 
 
4.3 Variance Decompositions 
Table 8 reports variance decompositions showing the contributions made by structural 
shocks and exogenous variables to the forecast error variances of realized and expected 
inflation at horizons of 1, 4, 8 and 20 quarters.
8 
This table shows, first, that the exogenous variables have large short-run effects on 
realized and expected inflation. Their contribution is almost 30% at horizons of 1 and 4 
quarters. However, their effects are not persistent.
9 Our second finding is that the monetary 
policy shock has a large effect. The contribution of the monetary policy shock to expected 
inflation is about 60% in the short run. Its contribution to inflation is negligible in the short 
run probably because of price stickiness, but increases to 30% within two to five years. Third, 
the contribution of the demand shock to realized and expected inflation is smaller than 15% at 
horizons of 1 and 4 quarters, but larger than 50% at a horizon of 20 quarters. Fourth, the 
inflation expectation shock has a limited effect. These findings suggest that changes in 
                                                  
8  Because there is apparently no conventional way to calculate the contribution of the exogenous 
variables, we simply add their one-standard-error deviations to our VAR model, while we add 
one-standard-error deviations of the structural shocks to calculate the contribution of the structural 
shocks. This method would be accurate if the exogenous variables were white noise. In our model, 
because we use changes in (rather than levels of) the exogenous variables, our exogenous 
variables are stationary and not strongly autocorrelated. 
9  The contribution of fresh food prices to realized inflation is still about 30% at a horizon of 8 
quarters. This is largely caused by the sample of the 1970s.  10
realized inflation are largely caused by changes in oil prices and fresh food prices in the short 
run, but in the medium to long run, are mainly changed by fundamentals such as output and 
monetary policy. This is consistent with Shiratsuka (2006). The same result is applied to 
changes in expected inflation. The second and fourth of these findings for Japan differ from 
those for the United States (see Section 5). 
 
4.4 Structural Shocks 
Figure 5 shows the historical movements of the two structural shocks, the inflation shock 
and the expected inflation shock. The most notable and interesting property is that the 
inflation expectation shock is occasionally unstable. During the oil price shocks of the 1970s 
and early 1980s, and during the asset price bubble and burst of the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, the expectation shock exhibited large fluctuations. This implies that an expectation 
shock occasionally affect inflation and the real economy. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
there were concerns about a deflationary spiral, but the figure does not justify these concerns. 
Up until the early 1980s, when the inflation shock was stabilized, there were large swings in 
the inflation shock. 
 
5.  Estimation Results (the United States) 
In this section, we report our estimation results for the United States. We also confirm that our 
methodology is validated by the US data. Table 9 shows that, as expected, all the estimated 
coefficients are positive except for a2, which is insignificant. The coefficient a3 lies between 
zero and unity, which suggests price stickiness and that households are forward-looking. The 
coefficient a6 is positive but insignificant. 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the impulse responses. They show that inflation expectations 
respond quickly to a monetary policy shock. Exogenous changes in energy prices and food 
prices affect inflation with a lag, but inflation expectations react quickly to changes in these 
prices. These results are consistent with those for Japan, and explain why inflation 
expectations lead realized inflation. An interesting difference between the US and Japanese 
results is that realized inflation reacts significantly to an inflation expectations shock in the 
United States. This implies that, in the United States, expectations shocks are self-fulfilling. 
Table 10 reports the variance decompositions, which convey the effects of monetary 
policy shocks. For all time horizons, their contribution to inflation expectations amounts to 
about 50%. The fact that the contribution of a monetary policy shock to realized inflation 
increases to up to 40% as the time horizon lengthens reflects price stickiness. The exogenous 
variables (changes in energy prices and food prices) have large effects, with contribution 
reaching about 20%. A contrast with Japan is that the effects are persistent in the United 
States but only transitory in Japan. This may explain why Japan experienced sharper  11
disinflation in the 1980s than did the United States. Table 10 also shows that expectations 
shocks account for about 10% variations in inflation and inflation expectations. This is twice 
as large as the corresponding contribution for Japan. 
Figure 8 illustrates the movements of two structural shocks, namely, the inflation shock 
and the inflation expectations shock. The inflation shock exhibited large fluctuations during 
the two periods of the oil price shocks, since when it gradually stabilized. The inflation 
expectations shock was particularly volatile during the period of the second oil price shock. 
 
6.  Robustness 
6.1 Japan 
Figures 9 to 18 examine the robustness of our estimates in different ways. First, we look 
at Japan. In addition to our baseline sample, 1975:Q1~2007:Q4, we use different samples, 
that is, 1975:Q1~1989:Q4, 1984:Q1~2007:Q4, and 1975:Q1~1999:Q1. The first two samples 
divide our full sample into early and late subperiods. The third sample ends in 1999:Q1, when 
the Bank of Japan lowered its policy interest rate to almost zero. Figure 9 shows that our 
estimates are quite robust. However, for the 1975:Q1~1989:Q4 sample, the monetary policy 
shock does not seem to be properly identified, judging from the observation that inflation 
rises following a positive interest rate shock. Figure 10 shows that if the estimating sample 
starts at 1983:Q1, the effects of the exogenous variables on inflation diminish. This is 
consistent with inflation having become more stable since the early 1980s. However, it is 
worth noting that the effects of the exogenous variables on inflation expectations have not 
changed much. 
Second, we estimate our model by extending the number of lags from two to four, using 
the computed output gap obtained from applying Hodrick−Prescott filter,
10  and excluding the 
exogenous variables. Figure 11 shows that our results are robust to these modifications. 
Third, we impose the SVAR restrictions shown in Figure 12. Under the first restriction 
(identification restriction 1), in equation (4), we allow the current output gap to be affected by 
the current change in inflation expectations. Under the second restriction (identification 
restriction 2), we allow the interest rate to respond not only to inflation expectations but also 
to current inflation. That is, we relax the zero restriction on 
e π  in the y equation and the 
zero restriction on π  in the i equation. However, because we had to impose exactly six 
restrictions to identify four structural shocks, we must introduce an additional restriction. To 
do so, we assume that current inflation is not affected by current output. Figure 12 
demonstrates that imposing these identification restrictions does not change our results much. 
However, imposing the identification restriction 2 speeds up the response of inflation to a 
                                                  
10  Rather than using the conventional smoothness factor λ = 1,600, we used λ = 20,000 because 
this value generates cyclicality that is better suited to Japanese business cycles.  12
monetary policy shock, compared with our baseline model. If we impose a recursive 
restriction on the ordering of (y,  π , i, 
e π ) from the exogenous variables (which seems to be 
the most reasonable ordering), then the impulse responses change dramatically (identification 
restriction 3). However, this restriction does not seem appropriate because, as the second 
column shows, a positive interest rate shock increases both inflation and expected inflation. 
This suggests that such a recursive restriction cannot be imposed to correctly identify a 
monetary policy shock. 
Fourth, we examine the robustness of our estimates to using different measures of 
inflation expectations. In transforming qualitative survey data into quantitative inflation 
expectations, we used the simplest and most widely used method, developed by Carlson and 
Parkin (1975). However, as shown in Figure 13, there are many variations to this method. For 
example, Hirata and Kamada (2006) adjust the method to correct for an upward bias that 
seems intrinsic to households’ inflation expectations. This adjustment yields much lower 
inflation expectations than ours for the whole sample period. Having argued that survey 
questions relate to changes in inflation rates rather than to changes in prices, Toyoda (1987) 
calculates inflation expectations by using realized inflation rates for each period. This method 
generates inflation expectations that are similar to realized inflation rates. We reestimate the 
SVAR by using these alternative measures of inflation expectations. As Figure 14 shows, the 
resulting impulse responses are similar to those from our baseline model. However, because 
of strong correlation with realized and expected inflation, using Toyoda’s (1987) inflation 
expectations causes the responses of inflation and expected inflation to be similar to each 
other. 
Fifth, we estimate the VAR in levels. We use real GDP instead of the output gap, price 
levels instead of inflation rates, and expected prices, that is, price levels multiplied by 
inflation expectations, instead of expected inflation rates. We impose the same nonrecursive 
restrictions as before. Figure 15 illustrates that our estimates are robust to this modification. 
 
6.2 The United States 
For the United States, Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the impulse responses for the two 
subperiods. Although the figures are similar, the effects of the monetary policy on inflation 
and inflation expectation are slightly larger in the 1970:Q1~1983:Q4 period than in the 
1984:Q1~2007:Q4 period. The same is true for the effects of the exogenous variables on 
inflation and inflation expectations. 
Figure 18 illustrates the impulse responses produced by increasing the number of lags 
from two to four, excluding the exogenous variables, and using the CPI instead of the core 
PCE deflator. Our results are robust to these modifications. 
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7.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of households’ inflation expectations in 
Japan and the United States. We estimate a vector autoregression in which the four 
endogenous variables are inflation expectations, inflation, the short-term nominal interest rate 
and the output gap, with changes in energy prices and (fresh) food prices being the exogenous 
variables. We impose short-term nonrecursive restrictions taking account of the simultaneous 
co-dependence between realized inflation and expected inflation. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, responding not only to changes in 
energy prices and food prices but also to monetary policy shocks, inflation expectations move 
more quickly than does realized inflation. This explains why inflation expectations appear to 
lead realized inflation according to Japanese and US data. It is also shown that our SVAR 
procedure resolves the price puzzle; an interest rate rise decreases prices even on impact. 
Second, in Japan and the United States, changes in energy prices and food prices have large 
effects on inflation and inflation expectations. However, in Japan, these effects are transitory, 
whereas in the United States, they are persistent. Third, expectations shocks occasionally 
fluctuate greatly, and could have self-fulfilling effects on realized inflation. This self-fulfilling 
property is more apparent in the United States than in Japan. 
In implementing monetary policy, we need to forecast underlying inflation, and our 
findings suggest that expected inflation is a useful indicator. However, since the effects of 
energy prices and food prices on realized and expected inflation are only temporary, it is 
practically very important to adjust these effects and extract underlying expected inflation 
movements caused by fundamentals such as changes in output and interest rates. It is also 
important to pay attention to the risk that inflation expectations fluctuate greatly and have 
self-fulfilling effects on realized inflation. 
To investigate the properties of inflation expectations in more detail, we may need to 
subject our estimates to further robustness checks. This may include imposing other 
restrictions, making international comparisons and refining the time-series analysis. Although 
we focused on households, it is important to analyze firms and professionals. It is also 
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(about 5,000 cases; 










•  Price changes in the following year 
(or six months depending on the 
surveyed periods) 
•  Three (or five) qualitative choices 
until 2004 and seven quantitative 
choices from 2004. 
•  Quarterly until 2004, monthly from 
2004 
Opinion 






(about 4,000 cases; 









•  Price changes in the following one 
and five years 










1980  •  Price changes in the following year
•  Three qualitative choices 
•  Every two months 
TANKAN Enterprises 
(about 10,000 cases 
including 700 retailers; 





(no data in 
March 
1975) 
•  Output price changes in the 
following three months 
•  Three qualitative choices 
•  Quarterly 
ESP Forecast 
Survey 
36 economists who 





2004  •  Inflation rates in the following one 
quarter to two years 
•  Monthly 
Consensus 
Forecasts 
More than 240 
economists in the G7 
and Western countries 
Consensus 
Economics
1991  •  Inflation rates in the following one 
quarter to ten years 
•  Quarterly, but long-term forecasts 
are semiannual.   
 






       
0 0.54  0.54  0.57  0.55  0.55 
1 0.65  0.65  0.60  0.66  0.65 
2 0.69  0.69  0.61  0.70 0.68 
3  0.72  0.71  0.58  0.71  0.70 

























nonadjusted adjusted nonadjusted nonadjusted nonadjusted
 
Table 2: Correlations between Inflation and Inflation Expectations (Japan) 
Note: Yellow highlights represent the highest correlation.  18
 
   Respondents   
Quarters (leads of 
inflation 
expectations) 
Households Retailers  Economists 
0 0.54  0.83  0.83 
1 0.65  0.83  0.74 
2 0.69  0.83  0.62 
3  0.72  0.81 0.42 












 (next  year  forecasts) 
CPI coverage  Excl. fresh food 
Goods excl. fresh 
food 
Excl. fresh food 
CPI consumption tax  non-adjusted  adjusted  nonadjusted 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Inflation Expectations Surveys 
  in terms of Correlation with Inflation (Japan) 
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•  Price changes in the following year
•  Quantitative 
•  Quarterly 
Livingston 
Survey 
About 40 economists  FRB Philadelphia •  CPI and PPI changes in the 
following six months to ten years 
•  Quantitative 




About 50 economists  FRB Philadelphia •  CPI and PCE deflator changes in 
the following year and in the long 
run 
•  Quantitative 
•  Quarterly 
Consensus 
Forecasts 
More than 240 




•  Inflation rates in the following one 
quarter to ten years 
•  Quarterly, but long-term forecasts 
are semiannual.   
 






      
0  0.92 0.82  0.79  0.63 
1  0.94  0.87  0.71  0.64 
2  0.93 0.90  0.63  0.60 
3  0.90  0.91  0.46  0.54 










Price index  CPI  Core PCE  CPI  Core PCE 
 








0  0.92  0.91 
1  0.94  0.86 
2  0.93 0.75 
3  0.90 0.61 




Survey source  Michigan Survey  Livingston Survey 
Price index  CPI  CPI 
 
Table 6: Comparison of Inflation Expectations Surveys 
  in terms of Correlation with Inflation (the United States)  21
 
       Coefficients     
   5%  median  95% 
a1  0.29   1.32   14.03  
a2  0.00   0.13   0.25  
a3  −0.19   −0.03   0.06  
a4  0.25   1.09   3.99  
a5  3.08   8.07   27.22  
a6  1.07   2.30   7.69  
 
Table 7: Estimated Coefficients (Japan) 
 
 
(1)  Inflation  Rate          
     e_y  e_i  e_p  e_pe  dPoil  dPfresh 
  T  =  1  1.3   0.2   55.0   0.0   42.7   0.8  
  T  =  4  2.0   4.8   59.5   0.2   6.3   27.3  
  T  =  8  4.0   25.3  42.5   1.9   2.8   23.6  
  T  =  20  57.9   31.3  2.5   3.7   2.1   2.4  
            
(2)  Inflation  Expectations         
     e_y  e_i  e_p  e_pe  dPoil  dPfresh 
  T  =  1  0.2   62.8  0.4   2.3   31.5   2.9  
  T  =  4  12.9   80.6  3.2   1.3   0.1   1.9  
  T  =  8  48.5   44.4  3.2   0.4   1.1   2.4  
  T  =  20  78.3   11.8  0.8   5.0   3.8   0.3  
 
Table 8: Variance Decompositions (Japan)  22
 
       Coefficients    
   5% median  95% 
a1  1.22   3.09   11.28  
a2  −0.05   −0.01   0.03  
a3  0.06   0.12   0.17  
a4  0.30   0.88   6.91  
a5  0.60   2.00   17.44  
a6  −1.08   0.80   5.68  
 
Table 9: Estimated Coefficients (the United States) 
 
 
(1)  Inflation  Rate          
     e_y  e_i  e_p  e_pe  dPenergy  dPfood 
  T  =  1  0.0   7.8   86.6   2.3   0.1   3.2  
  T  =  4  3.8   20.5  23.1   17.5  6.6   28.4  
  T  =  8  17.3   24.7  3.5   13.8  14.1   26.6  
  T  =  20  7.4   43.5  0.7   13.4  17.7   17.3  
            
(2)  Inflation  Expectations         
     e_y  e_i  e_p  e_pe  dPenergy  dPfood 
  T  =  1  1.1   38.9  0.0   13.4  9.6   37.0  
  T  =  4  24.5   31.0  0.2   6.1   17.0   21.3  
  T  =  8  2.4   47.6  1.7   8.2   20.3   19.8  
  T  =  20  0.0   60.8  7.8   1.8   16.5   13.1  
 
Table 10: Variance Decompositions (the United States) 
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Figure 1: Movement of Inflation Expectations (Japan) 
 




































CPI (excluding fresh food, consumption tax nonadjusted, left axis)
Inflation expectations (Carlson−Parkin method, left axis)
Inflation expectations (DI, right axis)
(%, y/y) (DIɺinverse) 24
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to Structural Shocks (Japan) 
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses to Structural Shocks (the United States) 
 
 





























































































































































































































































Figure 9: Robustness 1.1: Different Samples (Japan) 
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Figure 11: Robustness 2: Miscellaneous Modifications (Japan) 
 
 
Figure 12: Robustness 3: Other Restrictions (Japan) 
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Figure 13: Various Measures of Inflation Expectations (Japan) 
 
Figure 14: Robustness 4: Various Measures of Inflation Expectations (Japan) 
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Figure 15: Robustness 5: VAR in Levels (Japan) 
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Figure 17: Impulse Responses to Exogenous Variables in Different Samples (the United 
States) 






































































































































































































13579 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 7 1 9
（％） 33
 
Figure 18: Robustness: Miscellaneous Modifications (the United States) 
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